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Abstract 
Gambling machines are a key component of global gambling tourism.  The taxation of these 
machines is a highly controversial area of policy debate involving tensions between industry 
profitability, economic growth and government revenue.  We present the background and 
context to the debate around the optimal taxation of gambling machines, and reach conclusions 
and recommendations based on the recent and extended literature as to the best way to tax 
gambling machines in order to enhance tourism. These recommendations provide guidance for 
jurisdictions in which gambling tourism is a significant actual or potential source of public 
revenue. 
 
1. Introduction and Background 
A number of countries have at various times in recent years sought to take advantage of the 
growth of gambling tourism by relaxing laws relating to the casino industry.  For example, the 
Gambling Act of 2005 allowed the introduction into the UK of a much greater number of high 
stake jackpot machines, liberalised laws on advertising and membership, and made legal the 
creation of larger scale casinos than hitherto allowed, including ‘resort casinos’ with unlimited 
jackpots. 68 local authorities applied for permission to have one of the larger casinos, with an 
additional eight bidding for a ‘resort casino’ (Department for Culture, Media and Sport Select 
Committee, 2012).  In the event, limited expansion has taken place to date largely due to 
political disputes framed around the issue of problem gambling.  
Casinos have, however, been particularly important for UK tourist destinations such as 
London, Brighton and Blackpool.1  Indeed, London is now viewed as one of the top four visitor 
destinations for casino tourism in the world.2  A range of other cities around the UK such as 
Cardiff, Glasgow, Newcastle and Sheffield have also emphasised the potential for gambling to 
regenerate tourism activities (Casino Advisory Panel, 2007).3 
 
1 See, for example, Visit London (www.visitlondon.com/things-to-do/nightlife/casino), Visit Blackpool 
(www.visitblackpool.com/latest-news/blackpool-hits-the-jackpot-with-major-investment-o/ ) and 
Brighton and Hove City Council (2017) 
2 See www.tntmagazine.com/entertainment/games-and-tech/the-top-5-gambling-cities-in-the-world 
3 In 2006, Manchester City Council argued that, “The proposed regional casino not only exploits 
Manchester’s tourism strengths but also contributes to remedying its weaknesses.” (Manchester City 
Council, 2006). 
 In addition to casino gambling serving as a driver for tourism and economic growth, 
governments around the world depend on casino gambling and its resulting tourism as an 
important source of tax revenue.  Indeed, the significance of revenue obtained from the taxation 
of tourism dollars is well established (see, for example, Ponjan and Thirawat, 2016; Forsyth et 
al, 2014; Nikkinen et al, 2018).4   
Large casinos are considered a particularly important tourist draw (Delfabbro and King, 
2017, p. 319), while Wardle et al. (2014) note that in the UK gambling venues are typically 
concentrated in tourist areas, including seaside suburbs.  Even so, the destination attraction of 
gambling differs depending on demographics and nationality (Rita et al., 2018).5 
Other research has found potentially significant economic costs of casino gambling.6  
Thompson et al. (2000) assert that costs such as fraud, forgeries, bad debts, and treatment costs 
outweigh the benefits of casino gambling.  Other authors (e.g. Grinols and Mustard, 2001, 2006; 
Simmons, 2000) also emphasise the social costs of gambling.  Simmons (2000) finds that while 
casinos do create employment in related industries, they also tend to divert consumer 
expenditures from other businesses, and casinos tend to create lower-paying jobs.  More mixed 
evidence on the employment impacts of casino generation are found by Garrett (2004).  Lastly, 
the displacement effects between casino revenue and state lottery revenue have been studied.  
Siegel and Anders (2001) report evidence of substitution between casinos and state lotteries, 
while Popp and Stehwien (2002) find evidence of a negative correlation between Indian casino 
gambling and state revenues. 
A key issue arising from these debates is the economic benefits and social costs of 
different types of gambling and the displacement effects between them, and the issue of revenue 
generation for state government through tax and the protection and growth of revenue by 
gambling operators (e.g. Walker and Jackson, 2011). 
Garrett (2001) uses state lottery agencies as a unique object of study as they, unlike 
other governmental units, openly acknowledge that their primary objective is revenue 
maximisation. In so doing, he is able to test whether the existing tax structure of lottery games 
was the revenue maximising structure.  He finds strong empirical evidence for the Leviathan 
model first proposed by Brennan and Buchanan (1977, 1980), in which only constitutional 
constraints on both the sources of revenue and levels of expenditure can curb government’s 
desire for continued revenue. 
 
4 For a broader overview of the economics of tourism, see Song et al. (2012). 
5 Millennial men are more attracted than women to gambling as a tourism motivation, and the unmarried 
more than the married, whilst Millennial Americans are more attracted to gambling as a tourism 
motivation than their British counterparts. 
6 A review of the literature on the socioeconomic impacts of gambling is provided in Walker and Sobel 
(2016). 
Martin and Yandle (1990) examine the determinants of states’ decisions to operate 
lotteries, providing an overview of the way that state sponsorship of gambling has been 
important historically.  One issue addressed specifically is that between the use of state lotteries 
and the taxation of private gambling as a means of revenue generation.   
Following on from this, Calcagno et al. (2010) examine the determinants of casino 
adoption decisions by state governments.  Their results suggest a public choice framework in 
which casino legalisation is determined by state efforts to attract tourism or “export taxes.”  
Still, the literature examining the taxation of electronic gambling (‘slot’) machines, a sector 
crucial for the tourism industry around the world, is much more limited. 
Philander (2019) considers the implications of any expansion in the prevalence of 
machine gambling within the wider health perspective related to the prevalence of casino 
gambling.  
 
2. Machine taxation policy in the UK 
There has also long been a significant gambling-machine industry in the UK based not only in 
casinos but also in bookmakers, bingo halls, pubs, and specialised arcades often located in 
seaside tourist areas.  Until relatively recently, however, UK gambling taxation was sector-
specific.  Sports betting was taxed based on the gross profits of betting operators (stakes 
received from bettors minus winnings paid out), whilst machines were subject to an annual 
licence fee (Amusement Machines License Duty or AMLD) as well as a sales tax (Value Added 
Tax, or VAT) levied on gross revenue.   
The level of AMLD was linked to the type of machine (higher for higher prize machines, 
ranging in 2012-13 from £3,150 p.a. for B1 machines in casinos to £935 p.a. for C machines – D 
machines were charged no AMLD).7 Category B1 machines had a maximum stake of £2 and 
jackpot of £4,000 – increased in 2014 to £5 and £10,000 respectively. Category C machines have 
a maximum stake of £1 and a maximum prize of £100. Category D machines have a maximum 
stake ranging from 10 pence to £1 and a maximum prize ranging from £5 to £50. 
Bingo halls were over this period permitted a maximum of eight B3/B4 machines (with 
a maximum stake of £2 and jackpot of £500), or 20% of the total number of gaming machines. 
Adult Gaming Centers (AGCs) were permitted a maximum of four such machines. 
 
7 See the Gambling Commission website for an explanation of all machine categories. 
https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/for-gambling-businesses/Compliance/Sector-
specific-compliance/Arcades-and-machines/Gaming-machine-categories/Gaming-machine-
categories.aspx 
 
In July 2011, the number of B3/B4 machines was increased to 20% of all machines. 
Licensed betting offices (LBOs) were allowed only four machines per betting shop (usually B2 
machines – Fixed Odds Betting Terminals). B2 machines had a maximum stake of £100 
(reduced in 2019 to £2) and a maximum jackpot of £500.  
In 2013, the UK Government decided to bring the tax system for electronic gambling 
machines into line with other gambling sectors, based on gross profits.  From 1 February of that 
year, the system of licence fees and sales tax for machine gambling was replaced with an 
exclusive gross profits tax known as Machine Games Duty (MGD). 
This followed a consultation exercise on the introduction of a machine games duty, 
published by HM Treasury on 24 May, 2011. In its document outlining the proposed changes to 
the taxation of gambling machines, HM Treasury argued that MGD would improve the 
sustainability and predictability of the tax regime by making it more resilient to changes in 
technology and regulation, as well as inflation. Because the taxation of machine games is more 
closely linked to machine profits under MGD, it is also a fairer system and helpful to businesses 
with less profitable machines. 
Key representations to the consultation pointed out that MGD would extend beyond the 
current scope of AMLD and raised concerns that this would adversely impact venues such as 
family entertainment centres. Suggestions were also put forward for changes aimed at limiting 
the impact of the VAT exemption, notably by including a de minimis limit for MGD to mirror the 
VAT threshold and allowing input VAT to be offset against MGD payable. A few business and 
trade organisations also suggested that instead of introducing MGD, all gambling activities 
should be made subject to VAT. BACTA, which represents the British amusement and gaming 
machine industry in the UK, was particularly critical of MGD, claiming that it would introduce 
additional complexity, compliance burden and cost. This could lead to closures, reduced 
investment, job losses and loss of tax revenue for the Treasury, and be likely to damage seaside 
towns and businesses.  
 In response (HM Treasury/HM Revenue & Customs, 2011b), the Government agreed to 
limit the scope of MGD to machine games offering cash prizes greater than stakes. Machines 
such as crane grabs and redemption machines only offering non-cash prizes would remain 
subject to the VAT.  This would, it was argued, help support many small family entertainment 
centres that are commonly found at British seaside resorts. The suggestions put forward aimed 
at limiting the impact of the VAT exemption were not adopted because they were either not 
permissible under existing law, would be highly complex to introduce, or would lead to 
significant avoidance risks. 
The rates of MGD vary by type of machine, from 5% for low stakes (maximum of 20 
pence), low jackpot (maximum of £10) machines, to 20% for other machines. A 25% duty was 
introduced on machines where the maximum stake can exceed £5, effective for accounting 
periods starting on or after 1 April, 2014, which took effect on 1 March, 2015.  In practice, this 
applied only to B2 machines. The introduction of MGD was intended to be revenue neutral, 
defined in terms of the overall impact on the Exchequer (HM Revenue and Customs, 2012, p.3). 
There has been a parallel controversy over the problem gambling effects of B2 
machines, and the maximum stake size on these machines, with the bookmakers in conflict with 
major lobbying and media pressure, as well as from the opposition parties in Parliament. 
However, it was the rate at which the tax was set that proved immediately controversial, as the 
gross profits tax to that date had been applied almost across the board to the rest of the 
gambling sector at 15%  (a notable exception was sports spread betting at 10% and financial 
spread betting at 3%).  The machine duty rate was set with reference to the price-elasticity 
estimates derived for HM Revenue and Customs and the Department for Culture, Media and 
Sport by Paton and Vaughan Williams (2005) – see HM Revenue and Customs, 2012, 2014. The 
shift in the approach to gambling machine taxation in the UK provides a natural experiment as 
to the effect of gross profits taxation.  
  
3. The switch from a licence fee to a gross profits system for taxing gambling machines 
Garrett et al. (2020) compare the options for taxing gambling machines (licence fees and 
taxation of machine profits) both by way of a theoretical framework and empirically.  In 
particular, they examine the impact of the switch from a licence fee system of taxation to a 
revenue-neutral gross profits tax on machines, testing whether it had any significant effect on 
the number of machines and on machine revenue.  They find that the switch from a licence fee 
system for gambling machines to one based on gross profits led to a significant increase both in 
the number of machines and in machine revenue in affected categories.  These results are 
consistent with their theoretical analysis in which the change to Machine Games Duty (a gross 
profits system of taxation) induced companies to introduce more machines.   
Specifically, the introduction of the gross profits tax system for machines led to a marked 
improvement in industry profitability and viability, including an increase in tax revenue from 
machines from c. £500 million a year to c. £720 million a year between 2012/13 (pre-GPT) and 
2018/19 (post-GPT) – see HM Revenue and Customs (2019).  
As such, they demonstrate that a shift in the system of taxation of gambling machines can 
resolve one of the key policy tensions between industry and government over the sustainability 
and growth of tax revenues versus industry profitability - namely, the enhancement of both 
public and private revenue. 
 
4. Summary and conclusions 
Gambling machines are a key component of global gambling tourism, yet there is very 
little established literature relating to the optimal taxation of these machines. Even so, the 
taxation of these machines is a controversial area of debate based around tensions between key 
stakeholders, linked to industry profitability, economic growth and government revenue.   
Garrett et al. (2020) address this gap in the literature by introducing a theoretical 
framework which shows that under reasonable assumptions, shifting from a per-machine licence 
fee to a gross profits tax on machine revenue can help to resolve these policy tensions. Their 
results reveal that the shift from licence fees to a Machine Games Duty based on gross profits led 
to a significant increase in the number of machines, as predicted by the theory, and in machine 
revenue.   
Based on the evidence presented there, the case for a switch to gambling taxation based 
on gross profits is especially well made in the context of the importance in many jurisdictions of 
gambling machine revenues for the tourism industry. For example, Las Vegas and Atlantic City, 
the casino gambling capitals of the US, each attract in a normal year tens of millions of people, 
while many local and state governments and hundreds of small communities rely on casino 
gambling for tourism and economic development. 
Gambling is also the dominant source of tourism for Macau, now the largest casino 
market in the world (see Sheng and Gu, 2018), while a number of other countries, such as 
Australia and the UK, have relaxed laws relating to the casino industry to attract gambling 
tourism. 
These results provide useful guidance for all parties involved in the gambling taxation 
debate, especially those jurisdictions in which gambling tourism is a significant actual or 
potential source of public revenue (Ponjan and Thirawat, 2016; Forsyth et al, 2014; Nikkinen et 
al., 2018).  
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